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Election Observation in Nigeria &
Madagascar: Diplomatic vs. Technocratic
Bias
Dirk Kohnert
International election observation has become a valuable means of
supporting African democratic polity. Notably, EU observer missions
adopting a professional approach are meant to shield against political
pressures from partisan stakeholder interests. However, this growing
professionalism did not necessarily lead to less biased observation results.
Available evidence suggests that in crucial cases, the origin and orientation
of the bias changed from ‘diplomatic’ to ‘technocratic’. The latter can be as
least as damaging to the declared aims of election observation as the former.
Two outstanding examples, the observation of transitional elections in
Nigeria and Madagascar, will serve to illustrate this hypothesis and its
consequences for the necessary reorientation of election observation
methodology.
Election Observation: African Regimes in Transition
The support for democratisation, including the right to participate in the establish-
ment of governments through free and fair elections, is a cornerstone of the foreign
policy and development co-operation of the European Union (EU), the United
Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and similar international bodies concerned
with democracy-building. Free elections are considered to be an essential step in the
democratisation process. They are supposed to promote good governance, respect for
the rule of law as well as a wide range of human rights (cf. EU, 2000:3-4; EIHDR, 2002).
‘An informed people, owning the electoral process, is the key factor in this context’
(EU, 2000:4). In broad terms international election observation is part of election
assistance. Its main goals are the legitimisation of an electoral process, where
appropriate, and the enhancement of public confidence, as well as respect for human
rights, and the capability for conflict resolution (cf. EU, 2000:4). Observer missions are
supposed to make informed judgments on the conduct of such a process, on the basis
of information collected by independent persons, who are not inherently authorised
to intervene in the process. International election observation is based on the
principles of full coverage, impartiality, transparency and professionalism (cf. IDEA,
1997:10; EU, 2002:5-6).
In general, election observation is informed by two distinctive but closely linked
major objectives. First, the interest of foreign policy to back good governance in
developing countries by recognising legitimate elections and governments. In what
follows, this will be called (for the sake of argument) the ‘diplomatic objective’.
Second, election observation is meant to assist the process of democratisation and the
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development of a human rights culture; this will be called the ‘aid objective’. Both
components share the ultimate aim of any development co-operation, that is, to make
itself redundant by entrenching innovations (like democracy) deep within each nation
through capacity-building (EU, 2002:5-6).
Of course, both elections and their observation are open-ended processes. Obviously
nobody should intimidate observer missions from refusing the stamp of ‘free and fair’
to elections on the grounds of the observer team’s own observations. The
consequences of this evaluation within the framework of performance-based aid
allocation, as outlined for example by the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 for ACP
countries (cf. Loquai, 2001), should apply to all governments, not just to those of
powerless small countries, like in the case of the presidential elections in Togo in 1998
and Kazakhstan in 1999. Unfortunately, double standards and rigged rules of the
observing agencies have been a major problem of international election observation
right from the beginning. For this reason, scholars concerned with the improvement
of this policy tool have repeatedly called for increasing professionalism and target-
directed implementation (cf. Engel et al. 1996; Mair, 1997).
In the following I will show that professionalism, as understood by the majority of
experts concerned, does not necessarily improve the outcome of election observation.
On the contrary, it may result in a technocratic bias, which is at least as damaging as
the diplomatic bias, which it proposes to cure. The EU approach to election
observation will serve as an example to illustrate this hypothesis, because it has justly
been considered the most professional and independent of all observation missions
funded by international public accounts. Nevertheless, the EU approach often has a
twofold bias, which should be corrected to meet the overall aims of democracy
assistance. It goes without saying that the following appraisal applies to other election
observation bodies as well. Two outstanding cases, the observation of transitional or
founding elections in Nigeria (February, 1999) and Madagascar (December, 2002),
will highlight the consequences of biased observation.1 Further reference will be made
to the diplomatic bias, but because the technocratic bias resulting from the striving for
professionalism has so far received little attention, I shall focus on the latter.
Diplomatic Bias
Certainly, as in any evaluation of political processes, there exists a considerable
margin of error and of wrong judgments concerning electoral processes in politically
sensitive situations. Therefore, precaution has to be taken not to base political or
economic sanctions on a disputed evaluation outcome, especially in ‘grey situations’
(EU, 2000:33), or in situations where there is a great discrepancy between formal and
informal politics, which even professional observers may find difficult to detect.
Nevertheless, notably in African transition countries, due regard should be paid to
both the above-mentioned aims of election observation. In these cases it becomes even
more pertinent not to favour the diplomatic objective at the expense of the
development orientation of election observation as a policy instrument. However,
notably in the case of founding elections, EU observer missions – like other
international observer missions – are apparently inclined to give a premium to
diplomacy. Conflict prevention is obviously the major reason for this deviation from
the declared aims of election observation. South African, Nigerian and Rwandan
founding elections in 1994, 1999 and 2003 are outstanding examples (cf. Szeftel, 1994;
Mustapha, 1999; ARB, 2003:15399-15402). But other vested interests also played a role,
for example, when governments of EU member states wanted to back western-
orientated presidents who came to power in difficult transition processes from
autocratic to democratic rule, as in the case of Kenya (2002; cf. Cliffe, 2003; Peters,
2002), Madagascar (2002, cf. below) or, as a failed case in point, Zimbabwe (2002, cf.
ZESN).
This is not to contest the right of the EU, state or international organisation to pursue
its own legitimate foreign policy. As far as  election observation as an ‘instrument’ is
concerned, it becomes biased and devalued if flawed elections are disguised for
diplomatic reasons. Unfortunately this was the case in the well-documented EU/UN
observation of the 1999 Nigerian presidential elections, which – together with the
preceding parliamentary and local government elections – represented a major
turning point in the transition from decades of military dictatorship to civilian rule.
For the first time since 1983 (with the exception of the annulled presidential elections
of 1993), Nigerians had the opportunity to exercise the right to change their
government. This election was a good example of a borderline case where
professional standards of election observation (as defined above) were violated by the
strong bias of diplomatic final pronouncements by national and international
observer missions declaring the elections to be ‘free and fair’.
The Transitional Monitoring Group (TGM), the largest group with 10,700 accredited
national observers, was quite outspoken in its fundamental rejection of the
presidential elections as ‘marked by widespread malpractice and irregularities, which
tainted the credibility of the process’, notably the account of the most disturbing
extent ‘to which electoral officers colluded across the country in the falsification of the
results’ (cf. Brunner & Stroux, 1999:44). Nevertheless, the majority of international
observation missions accepted the outcome of the elections as representing ‘the will of
the nation’ (cf. EU 2000:5, 30; Carter Center, 1999; Commonwealth, 1999). Others, like
the Association of African Election Authorities (AAEA/IFES, 1999) and the Nigerian
Independent National Election Commission (INEC, 1999), restricted themselves to a
‘technical evaluation’ of the legal and institutional framework and the organisational
capacity of the government, because they did not want to become embroiled in
politics (cf. Brunner & Stroux, 1999:46). All these political restrictions, although
motivated by a wide range of different interests and characterised by different
assessments, had one underlying major informal aim in common: they were
apparently made mainly for reasons of diplomacy, particularly because of the
paramount concern for political stability and conflict prevention in the sub-region in
the aftermath of the Abacha dictatorship (cf. Brunner & Stroux, 1999:47; Kew,
1999:30). The Washington-based international Non-Government Organization (NGO)
Human Rights Watch (1999) gave an instructive summary of the cautious, but at the
same time ambiguous statements of national and international observation groups of
the 1999 Nigerian presidential elections.
By contrast, major independent institutions, academics, and at least some participat-
ing international observers were more forthright (and probably also more impartial)
in their appraisal. They characterised these elections as rigged right from the
beginning, as not representing the will of the electorate, or if they did, then only in so
far as most Nigerians were willing to accept an obviously flawed process in order to
get rid of the military dictatorship (cf. Kew, 1999:29; Sesay & Ukeje, 1999; Ihonvbere,
1999; Enemuo, 1999; Maja-Pearce, 1999; Mustapha, 1999:287; Greiter, Jockers &
Rhode, 1998; Brunner & Stroux, 1999). The overall evaluation of the democratic
process in Nigeria by the intergovernmental International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an organisation founded in 1995 with global
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membership, independent of specific national interests which – in its own words –
seeks to nurture and support sustainable democracy world-wide, was revealing:
In interrogating the role of political parties in the new political order, the point of departure
is the sad, but accurate observation that Nigeria does not yet have political parties. Instead,
it has associations of personalities that organize to get themselves – or, if that fails, their
friends – elected into state office, for the sole purposes of engaging in accumulation and self-
aggrandizement. The elections that heralded the Fourth Republic are believed to have been
so widely rigged that they are now called ‘selections’. Elections in Nigeria, by and large,
have been no more than ‘choiceless’ exercises in which the outcome has often been
determined before election day (IDEA, 2000:142).
Apparently the EU team observing the Nigerian parliamentary and presidential
elections in April/May 2003 learned its lesson. There was little to choose between the
1999 and 2003 elections in terms of electoral rigging, gross human rights violations,
and violence, nor indeed did the threat of attempted coups or outright civil war differ
much between the first poll and the second. Yet the EU observer mission’s evaluation
indicates a significant change of approach over the intervening period of four years.
Despite considerable political and diplomatic pressure from diplomatic  interests, not
least from the Nigerian government and its peers in the AU and ECOWAS, the 2003
EU mission preserved its political and professional independence. Headed by Max
van den Berg (the Netherlands), the team courageously documented widespread
fraud and manipulation, which seriously endangered the legitimacy of the presiden-
tial and a number of gubernatorial elections, as in several states even the minimum
standards for democratic elections were not met (cf. EU, 2003a; Jockers, Rohde &
Peters, 2003; EU, 2003; Traub-Merz, 2003:1; Akinola, 2003; Semenitari, 2003). To be
fair, the EU mission commended the election process for having successfully avoided
clashes between the Northern and Southern power groups, which might have led to
the disintegration of the state. But this acknowledgement did not shield the EU
observer group from severe criticism on the part of the Nigerian head of state,
Olusegun Obasanjo, ECOWAS and AU members, and probably also on the part of
some EU member state diplomats.
However, there is no guarantee that even EU observations will maintain their high
professional standards and continue to resist the kind of politically motivated
pressure, which typically results in the ‘diplomatic bias’. There is a considerable
range of possible outcomes, not least because of differences of political orientation
and qualification among members of the observer mission core team (cf. Baker, 2002;
Mair, 1997). This has only recently been confirmed by the outcome of the observation
of Rwanda’s presidential election in 2003. In a somewhat diplomatic (preliminary)
statement, the EU observers characterised this first presidential election since the 1994
genocide as ‘an important step in the democratic process’, but as ‘not entirely’ free and
fair, because ‘there is still work to be done in terms of credibility, transparency and
freedom of expression’. In addition, the EU observers raised concerns about the
intimidation of opposition supporters during the election campaign (cf. EU-Rwanda,
2003). Nevertheless, they were accused by the Rwanda government and the Rwandan
National Electoral Commission as biased and as a ‘delegation (which) came to our
country just to make a political report’ (‘Rwanda rejects poll critics’, BBC news, 29
August 2003). Earlier, the South African observer mission had already appraised the
election as ‘free and fair’. Human Rights Watch representative Alison Des Forges, on
the other hand, declared: ‘It is not an exercise in democracy by the standards of
anywhere in the world’, and Amnesty International said in a statement on 22 August:
‘The government has stage-managed the first post-genocide elections in a climate of
fear and intimidation’ (cf. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 August 2003:15401).
Whereas the above examples of diplomatically veiled criticism of rigged elections
may have been justified on account of honourable overriding political intentions,
notably that of crisis prevention, there are other sad examples which clearly
document mere opportunistic backing of autocratic rulers by their peers. The reports
of the Francophonie (OIF, cf. AFP,  6 June 2003), the AU, and ECOWAS observation
teams on the undemocratic presidential elections in Togo (1 June 2003) are cases in
point. One can only hope that this is not a true reflection of the poor quality and
insufficient impartiality of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) established
by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in June 2002.
The apparent ambiguity of the diplomatic bias undermines the confidence of the
stakeholders in this policy instrument, because it can easily be exploited by partisan
interests in the pursuit of illegitimate aims; therefore it should be proscribed
altogether. A clear separation between the aims of international election observation
on the one hand, and other legitimate tools of international or foreign policy on the
other, is not only feasible, but also more target-directed and effective, and is therefore
highly recommended.
Technocratic Bias: Malagasy Founding Elections, 2002
In view of the ambitious aims of international election observation, Western donors
are frequently criticised for focusing exclusively and excessively on formal
procedures of democracy such as elections. This holds especially for developing
countries in Africa where the informal sector both in politics and economics may be
more important than the formal (cf. Bayart, 1989; Bayart et al. 1997; Chabal & Daloz,
1999; Engel et al. 1994). Democracy cannot be imposed by foreigners, and elections are
only one prerequisite of democratisation. Therefore the EU is right in emphasising
that care should be taken not to legitimise an illegitimate process by backing
manipulated elections through international election observation (cf. EU, 2002:5).
Without the necessary constitutional and socio-cultural framework allowing for
genuine democracy, seemingly free and fair elections may degenerate to ‘illiberal
democracy’ (cf. EU, 2000:3, in quoting Zakaria, 1997:42), or to window-dressing of
autocratic governance (cf. Douglas, 1998:471-475; Erdmann, 2002). Consequently, the
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has recently
reallocated funds designated for electoral assistance between the mid-1990s and 2002
to democracy-building with a self-declared bottom-up approach. The proportion of
funds allocated for elections has fallen from over 50 per cent to 15 per cent; most EU
member states have earmarked an even smaller percentage of their national
programmes for this purpose (cf. Youngs, 2003:129). Nevertheless the top-down
approach and the focus on formal procedural components of democratic polity is still
very much alive, at least in the field of election observation. Apart from the
diplomatic bias, this is one of the major causes of the distortion of election observation
as instrument of EU development cooperation and foreign policy.
Available evidence suggests that, although election observation becomes more target-
orientated and less prone to political pressure with increasing professionalism, this
does not necessarily make it less biased. What is likely to differ in many cases, is
rather the origin and orientation of the bias involved: professionalism often promotes
political engineering, and therefore it is likely to replace diplomatic bias with
technocratic bias. The latter may be as least as damaging to the declared aims of
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election observation as the former. This will be demonstrated by the following
example of EU observation of parliamentary elections in Madagascar (December,
2002). The professional approach of EU election observation in this case was flawed
not so much for diplomatic, but rather for ‘technical’ reasons. This may be explained
by two factors. First, democracy-promotion by the EU still suffers from shortcomings
in the conceptualisation of the link between democracy-building and the local level of
social and cultural development; that is, an insufficient understanding of the close
interrelatedness of social, economic and political change (cf. Youngs, 2003; 2001).
Second, and closely related to the first, the growing professionalism of the approach
of international election observation provokes the risk of falling into the same trap as
other sophisticated instruments of development assistance have done before: the risk
of political and social engineering without due regard to the indigenous socio-
cultural setting.2 Accentuated by the increasing commercialisation of the ‘business’ of
international election observation, many experts who compete on the international
market for participation in observer missions tend to become technocratic (cf.
Kohnert, 1994; 1995). They concentrate on those technical domains which they know
best, for example, the legal and (formal) institutional framework of a democratic
multi-party system, analyses of the media, sound scientific sampling procedures,
close supervision of the aggregation and fast and safe communication of polling
results etc., and they tend to disregard adapting this knowledge to local socio-cultural
conditions. Therefore it is often assumed that local experts, fluent in the vernacular
and acquainted with the cultural setting, are more observant of what really matters.
Unfortunately this assumption is hardly less misleading (cf. Kohnert, 1995).
Thus it may happen that even professional election observers turn a blind eye to
informal politics of African countries in transition, not just for diplomatic reasons,
lack of time and resources, or because they think that ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart) do
not matter, but also because of professional blinkers reinforced by globalised
standards of democratisation (as explained below). In what follows I want to
highlight in some detail the danger inherent in this technical approach to election
observation. I shall do so by looking at examples of heuristic value from EU
observation of the legislative elections of December 2002, which have not been as
thoroughly documented as the Nigerian elections of 1999.
Malagasy Pre-electoral Political Situation & International Relations
Madagascar experienced a deep political and economic crisis in the first half of 2002
following a disputed presidential election on 16 December 2001. While apparently
neither candidate won an absolute majority, the opposition candidate, a wealthy
businessman and mayor of the capital Antananarivo, Marc Ravalomanana, claimed
the poll was rigged in favour of the outgoing president. His contender, Admiral
Didier Ratsiraka, the representative of the old regime, was running (with interrup-
tions) for his fifth term of office. Results from the National Electoral Council (CNE)
and the Interior Ministry gave Ravalomanana a lead with 46 per cent against
Ratsiraka’s 40 per cent. Since neither candidate achieved the absolute majority, a
second ballot was declared necessary. Ravalomanana refused to take part in a run-off
against President Ratsiraka, because his own supporting committee (KMMR) and a
consortium of national election observers, mainly from church organisations (FFKM,
Consortium of National Election Observers (CNOE) etc.), claimed that he had won an
outright majority of the votes (51 to 56 per cent) (cf. CNOE, 2002; Urfer, 2002). In
January 2002, Ravalomanana and his supporters mounted a general strike and mass
protests in the capital to support their demand for a recounting of the votes. As the
regime in power had refused the participation of foreign observers, and the Ratsiraka-
appointed Constitutional High Court was regarded as biased in favour of the ancien
régime (cf. Marcus, 2002:6-8; Marcus/Razafindrakoto, 2003), Ravalomanana and his
supporters proclaimed him president on 22 February 2002. Conciliatory efforts by the
international community, notably by the OAU, the predecessor of the African Union
(AU), failed. On 17 March, Ratsiraka rejected a proposal by the OAU to form a
‘reconciliation government’. On 17April the reconstituted Constitutional High Court
(HCC) recounted the votes and declared Ravalomanana the winner of the 2001
presidential elections with 51 per cent of the votes. The Ratsiraka regime rejected the
ruling, and the administrative authorities of four of the six Malagasy provinces
threatened with secession. The subsequent stalemate resulted in a paralysed national
economy and in violent conflicts verging on civil war. The scourge of
instrumentalisation of ethnicity and regional affiliation for partisan reasons or just for
economic gain, interventions by mercenaries and warlords, well-known from the
transition processes of other African states, emerged in Madagascar as well
(anonymus, 2002; Larson, 2002; Raison, 2002; Raison-Jourde/Randrianja, 2002;
Ramamonjisoa, 2002). The majority of the population, supported by leaders of
mainstream Christian churches, reached a social consensus about the necessity of a
political revival. Because large parts of the army remained neutral or even supported
the new regime, the latter finally succeeded in June in overcoming  the last pockets of
armed resistance by pro-Ratsiraka governors in the North of the country (cf.
Chaigneau, 2002; Urfer, 2002).
Most African states and major donors (France, USA, EU, Japan, IMF/WB) were
initially reluctant to recognise the new regime. This holds notably for France, so far
the major bilateral donor, which honoured its historical links with the Messieurs
Afrique. In view of the continuing isolation of the new Malagasy regime by the AU
through its refusal to admit the country to its own ranks, major Western donors
mounted pressure for premature legislative elections, originally scheduled for May
2003. They considered early elections as a litmus test of the legitimacy of the
Ravalomanana government and as a pre-condition for the substantial financial
support for national reconstruction promised at a donor conference in Paris on 14
July. The key question was, as Marcus (2002:3) pointed out: ‘If a challenger is faced
with a highly flawed electoral process and a dearth of constitutional options for
rectifying the outcome, then does that give him license to undertake extra-
constitutional measures in the name of a more democratic end?’ This question was
answered unambiguously, both by the unexpected and unwavering commitment of
sections of the civic society, notably in the capital, and by the early reaction of some
European governments, especially through the German and Swiss ambassadors in
Antananarivo.3 In this crucial phase of the transition process, ‘civic action was not
only an acceptable option, but the only option for saving the country from a
significant backslide towards an opaque political system led by a self-serving
autocrat’ (Marcus, 2002:3-4).
Therefore the National Assembly (lower house of parliament) and the former Senate,4
still dominated by the former ruling party AREMA (Association for the Rebirth of
Madagascar) and the old regime, were dissolved on 16 October, and parliamentary
elections were set for 15 December 2002. The electoral law of 11 October promulgated
a revised demarcation of a total of 160 constituencies, each providing for one seat in
parliament. The polling process was to be supervised by a new national election
council (CNE). The revision of the electoral list, the registration of some six million
voters and of the 1,319 candidates, representing more than 40 parties finally
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recognised by the HCC, started in October. However, the distribution of voters’ cards
was only completed on 8 December. TIM, (Tiako-I-Madagasikara, or I Love Madagascar
in the Malagasy language), was the slogan and designation of the key pro-
Ravalomanana party. AREMA, now the major opposition party, as well as the parties
close to the former President Albert Zafy, propagated a ‘front of refusal’ and
threatened to boycott the elections. Owing to internal faction fighting, the boycott
failed to achieve tangible results. A number of former allies of Ratsiraka and Zafy
were enticed and defected to join the promising TIM or to become independent
candidates. For the first time in Madagascar’s electoral history, observers from the
European Union (EU) were invited to monitor the elections alongside the AU,
Francophone and national observers (cf. Urfer, 2003).
As a large part of the population thought that their political choice had been
demonstrated already by the civic campaigns in January 2002, political observers
forecasted low voter participation. In fact, many Malagasy citizens were confused
about the real aim of the legislative elections, notably because there was a manifest
tendency, supported by certain candidates of TIM and the pro-Ravalomanana
coalition, to present these elections as the second round of the presidential elections of
December 2001, for the purpose of legitimising ex-post the President’s disputed
victory (cf. Urfer, 2003:1, 11). For other voters the election constituted a challenge to
the functioning of the institutional framework of democracy in view of the unchanged
underlying social structure of patrimonialism and the prebend economy. However,
the EU and the AU were apparently more concerned with the ex-post legitimisation of
the presidential election and the victory of the President than with parliamentary
elections for their own sake, or with the change of power by popular pressure, that is,
by unconstitutional means. The latter constituted in their view a break of formal
democratic rules, which should be corrected as far as possible by proper
parliamentary elections. In what follows, I propose to show that it is open to question
whether the EU observer mission’s emphasis on formal democratic procedure,
without due regard to the socio-cultural setting, served the cause of promoting
substantial democracy in Madagascar.
Aims of EU Election Observation, 2002
At the invitation of the Malagasy government (dated 31 July), the EU agreed to
observe the proposed legislative elections of 15 December, with the mandate to
‘guarantee a credible observation of the entire electoral process’ (cf. website: www.ue-
moem.org, 10 June 2003; author's note 3/2004: website extinct; website address was
high-jacked by a porno provider. At least the EU observation reports on the 2002
election in Madagascar can be found on the following website: http://europa.eu.int/
comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/mdk/index.htm).
The EU undertook to present the Malagasy government, the donors, and the general
public with an impartial evaluation of the electoral process, with special regard to the
following potential pitfalls of the electoral proceedings:
• Absence of rules concerning the financing of political parties;
• Regulations concerning birth certificates as substitute for identity cards;
• Establishment of polling lists;
• Distribution of voters’ cards;
• Utilisation of original ballot papers and envelopes;
• Regulations concerning deployed officials or migrant voters absent from
 their home towns;
• Consolidation and viability of transmission of the results;
• Control of equal access to the media (cf. EU 2002).
The general aims of the EU’s election assistance and observation, corresponding to the
criteria of political conditions attached to aid, were to promote free and fair elections
as a precondition for promoting human rights and genuine democracy in order to
create sustainable development.5 Besides, there were vested interests of participating
EU-member states and other major donors, not necessarily in line with these declared
aims, and sometimes even contradicting one another (cf. Rajaonah, 2002; Brüne &
Quillien, 2002). However, for the overwhelming majority of the EU members the most
pressing priority was to legitimise the new pro-western Ravalomanana regime,
representing for them a transition process to liberal multi-party democracy, good
governance and free trade, as promised and initiated by the Ravalomanana
government since its establishment in April 2002.
Questionable Observation Approach & its Implementation
The formalistic approach applied by the EU’s election observation mission in
Madagascar was well adapted to the aim of legitimising ex-post the newly-
established political powers in Antananarivo; a total of 89 observers from the EU took
EU-Wahlbeobachter in Madagaskar aus Sicht der Madagascar Tribune, 02 Décembre 2002
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part in the exercise. Apart from the core team of six experts, who arrived earlier on 6
November, 16 long-term observers (LTOs, about four weeks’ stay), 46 short-term
observers (STOs, about two weeks’ stay), nine members of a delegation of European
parliamentarians and seven voluntary European observers, were deployed across the
six provinces, 80 per cent of them in the countryside. In total they observed 465 out of
17,027 polling stations countrywide on voting day – 15 December. One cornerstone of
that approach was the selection of an in-depth sample of 62 observed polling stations
(bureaux de vote) and district census offices (commissions de recensement matériel de vote,
CRMV), even in remote rural areas, to guarantee a balanced survey as far as possible.
Here the observers had to monitor not only the voting, but also the counting
proceedings, the transfer of data to the CRMV at district or provincial levels, and the
consolidation of the results at CRMV level.
The STOs were meant to observe not just the polling day, but at least the final three
days of the electoral campaign, which lasted two weeks (from 30 November to 14
December). But because a significant number of the STOs arrived late at their
destination due to transport problems, and because they had to familiarise
themselves with their region first, this was not always possible, as they were not able
to leave the capital before 11 December. In addition experts of the EU mission
monitored private and public radio and TV stations as well as print media to establish
whether equal access to the media was guaranteed.
Implementation of the observation approach was basically ‘top-down’, with a
hierarchical line of command from the core team via the LTOs to the STOs. This
certainly enhanced the rapid and reliable reporting of observation results to the core
team. On the other hand, it discouraged short-term experts from showing initiative
and taking personal responsibility, which proved to be necessary wherever the rigid
rules set by the core team had to be adapted to local conditions on account of African
‘politics of the belly’ (cf. Bayart, 1989, 1997; Chabal & Daloz, 1999). In addition, the
structure effectively prevented ‘bottom-up’ evaluation by STOs of local political and
cultural factors influencing the election, partly on account of the work overload
resulting from the legalistic questionnaire methodology of the statistical sample.
The following Malagasy proverb reflects the a critical view of this inflexible
eurocentric vision: Vazaha lany mofo, lany zavatra tsakoina, meaning ‘a White man who
has finished his bread has nothing else to gnaw’.6 One outstanding example of the
disregard for socio-cultural factors was the lack of interpreters. Thus, in villages
where no one in the polling stations understood French, the EU observers were not
able to communicate with the staff, party representatives or the national observers:
the EU observers could not speak Malagasy, and unauthorised persons – like the
drivers, whom many observers normally asked for help, were not allowed on the
premises of the polling stations. The lack of interpreters was readily recognised as a
restriction by the core team, but excused with the lack of funds. However, it probably
also reflected euro-centric priorities – priorities that paid little attention to cultural
issues, but showed a preference for technocratic solutions, high-tech input (like
satellite and cellular phones and four-wheel drive cars for every observer team), and
statistically sound sample surveys. The aim to cover even the most remotest village in
this sample survey was certainly well-intentioned, because it meant to forestall
possible accusations of unrepresentative observation. But given the notoriously bad
infrastructure of Madagascar, this commitment meant that observers not only lacked
the time to acquaint themselves with the local socio-cultural setting, but that they
risked (at least in extreme cases) to spend polling day in the middle of nowhere,
looking at their broken-down vehicles instead of monitoring voting procedures.7
It is doubtful whether the legalistic ‘top-down’ approach with its emphasis on formal
political procedures adopted by the EU mission in Madagascar was appropriate even
in terms of its own declared main objective, namely to guarantee credible observation
of the entire electoral process. First of all, it was clear from the outset that the electoral
campaign could not be reduced to the period of some four days prior to polling day.
Crucial steps relating to the institutional political framework, which influenced the
outcome of the election, had been taken months and even years before the event.
There are good reasons to assume that the electoral process, both for the presidential
and the legislative elections of December 2001 and 2002, did not start with the
balloting or even with the official electoral campaigns. It actually all began with the
constitutional referendum of 15 March 1998 and the subsequent decentralisation
policy, instrumentalised by the partisan interest of the ruling elite, with important
effects on the voting system (cf. Marcus, 2002:6-7). However, the LTOs and the STOs
had neither the time nor the resources to evaluate properly how the run-up to the
election affected polling at local level. Moreover, the core team failed to generate even
a basic awareness of these factors among the observers. Second, extensive political
analyses of Malagasy politics and reports by the consortium of national observers
(CNOE) had previously underlined the vital role of informal politics in the
presidential elections of December 20018 (cf. CNOE, 2002; Larson, 2002; Marcus, 2002;
Randrianja, 2002, 1997; Raison-Jourde & Randrianja, 2002; Roubaud, 2000; Urfer,
2002). Both the reports of the consortium (CNOE) and relevant analyses should have
been known to the EU mission well in advance of their arrival, since this information
was readily available – even on the internet, with part of the material even being
mentioned on the EU mission’s own website. It is hard to understand why this
materials had hardly influenced the EU mission’s programme or plan of action.
The EU approach was even more questionable in respect of the ‘aid objective’ as set
out above: the overall aim of election observation to promote sustainable and
substantial democracy. Although there are internationally recognised globalised
values of democratisation, these rules and value systems still allow for different
democratic cultures. Wole Soyinka (1994:13) summarised these under the heading of
the Democratic Tendency, and they include popular participation in political decisions
and development-orientated governance. I propose to follow Amartya Sen and Wole
Soyinka in defining (in opposition to cultural relativism) a philosophical concept of
democratisation and development beyond the limitations of a focus on material
welfare. In this vision, democratisation appears as a process guided by universal aims
of mankind, and these aims relate to one another not in a competitive manner, as for
instance economic growth and human rights often do, but the vision incorporates
cornerstones of the raison d’ être of the human community, like the guarantee of basic
human rights (including the respect of the cultural heritage and poverty alleviation)
and, at the same time, democratisation (cf. Sen, 2002:2-6; Soyinka, 1994:7, 9;
Hountondji, 2001). In case of doubt, a legalistic approach to international election
observation supports existing structures of the old authoritarian political system,
rather than representing an emancipating momentum for the democratic tendency. In
many parts of Madagascar, for example, Western-style elections are still conceived
not as a possibility of choice (mifidy), but as an act of allegiance (mandatsabato)
(personal communication, S. Randrianja). Thus the legalistic approach runs the risk of
falling in line with the flimsy excuse of the cultural apology by African dictators, as
castigated by Soyinka (1994).
Two examples may suffice to illustrate this point: in order to observe at close range
the counting and the elaboration of the official protocol (process verbal, PV), the STOs
were obliged by the core team to stay at their last polling station overnight should the
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PV not be ready. Their presence was meant both as a deterrent against any possible
cheating and to monitor the elaboration and transfer of the PV to the CRMV. It soon
became clear that the semi-literate personnel responsible for the counting, even
though not well-equipped, were dedicated to their task: to sort out their figures and to
fill in – painstakingly writing word for word – the eight copies of the big PV
questionnaire in dim candlelight. There was no question of cheating, all the more
since their favourite, an independent Muslim teacher of the opposition, was
apparently leading the poll. The voluntary but unqualified peasants, who finally
signed the PV, worked with great zeal. After the counting was completed and the
results were announced in public, most of the signatories – some of whom had been
working on their farms before manning the polling stations – were so tired, that some
of them quietly left to attend to their personal needs and to those of their families.
However, they were obliged by the remaining staff to return, probably to honour the
continued presence of the two vazaha, who were to wait for the PV to be ready.9 The
vazaha were treated with respect and hospitality. Nevertheless, after hours of waiting
and as midnight approached, the staff apparently longed for their departure. Under
these special local conditions, the persistent presence and close follow-up by the
observers reminded some villagers more of supervision and of neo-colonial attitudes
than of non-partisan observation. Even worse, the observers’ persistence was
regarded as disrespectful of local customs, and was not seen as motivation for
substantial democratic behaviour. Therefore, the observers finally decided to break
the rules and left, probably to the great relief of the villagers. The polling station was
closed after their departure. The exercise continued the next morning, since the local
staff in any event had no means of transport to take the PV to the CRMV (some  45 km
away) at night.
Thus, under certain conditions, the formalistic or technical inclination of the EU
approach could be seen as an imposition of foreign concepts on well-intentioned
villagers. In addition, and with even more serious consequences, this attitude could
be seen as (implicit or involuntary) support for similarly formalistic behaviour by
state officials at district or provincial level, e. g. in dealing with opposition candidates’
complaints, which may have been regarded as inopportune by the new pro-
Ravalomanana administrators. This possibly happened in the case of the independent
Muslim candidate in Vohemar district mentioned earlier.
When it became apparent during the consolidation process that this candidate was in
the lead, the observers were informed by the authorities that the CRMV could
unfortunately not consider the votes for him in 14 polling stations because of formal
mistakes in the PVs. The mistakes mentioned by the CRMV were minor formal faults
– the absence of one of the required seven signatures from the PV, which could easily
be explained on account of the appalling conditions under which the PVs were
prepared (as described before). In addition, there was no reason to assume a
disagreement between the signatories as an explanation for the refusal of a signature,
because the majority in this region of the vanilla-cultivating Islamic north-east of
Madagascar was clearly in favour of the Muslim candidate. Even from a legal point of
view the decision to disregard votes was questionable, because according to the
electoral law the CRMV had no right to declare the votes invalid. Instead, it would
have to report any irregularities, together with its own evaluation, to the next higher
hierarchical level. Subsequently the rival of the presumed winner of the election, a
candidate of the ruling party TIM, was declared winner. The villagers who had voted
for their hero must have been bewildered by this news. The unsuccessful candidate,
shocked by his defeat, on the spot asked some expatriates for advice. On their
recommendation he drafted a formal written complaint the same night and addressed
it to the CRMV, the district head, the Federal Ministry of Interior, and the HCC. But
lacking the procedural means of writing such a request and being inexperienced in
juridical procedures, he missed some important points. However, apparently this did
not matter; on 10 January 2003, the HCC discarded the complaint, once again for
formalistic reasons: the judges refused to consider the request because they received it
only in one copy instead of the required two.10
Madagascar: Major Results of EU Election Observation
One indisputable advantage of the EU observation approach was the timely delivery
of the results. Just three days after the polling on 18 December, the head of the EU
mission, Mrs. Tana de Zulueta, member of the Italian Senate, published her
preliminary conclusions. In view of the violent conflicts during the transition process
which resulted in this premature legislative election, the mission congratulated the
Malagasy people for the calm demonstrated during the polling, and commended the
administration for the considerable efforts made to assure a proper election. Apart
from an overall positive evaluation of the elections, she nevertheless observed some
failures: the voting lists and distribution of voters’ cards were not always up to date;
the boycott of the election by certain sections of the political class could have
undermined the confidence of certain voters in the democratisation process; in some
isolated cases intimidation of voters and candidates had been observed, notably in
Tamatave, Tuléar and Mahajanga. Finally, the mission deplored that the voters
received insufficient information from the media and the electoral campaign to clarify
their understanding of the different propositions of the parties (cf. EU, 2002). The EU
mission was present up to the declaration of the official results by the Constitutional
High Court (HCC) on 11 January 2003. The evaluation of the last phase of the electoral
process in the final EU declaration of 13 January did not change significantly. It
stressed once more the positive development and consolidation of the democratic
national institutions by this process. In addition, the general calm of the post-election
period, disturbed only by isolated demonstrations, and the rapid pace with which the
polling results were consolidated and transmitted to the HCC, were praised. The EU-
commission deplored the limited presence of the CNE in the provinces to supervise
the elections, but conceded nevertheless its more active role during the post-election
period (cf. www.ue-moem.org, 10 June 2003).
With this landslide victory, TIM and its allies of the Firaisankinam-pirenena (National
Alliance) together won at least 132 seats (82 per cent) out of a total of 160 in the new
Malagasy parliament.11 This embodied, first, a complete reversal of the legislative
power structure which before had been dominated by AREMA. Second, it
represented an ex-post legitimisation of the contested result of the presidential
elections in favour of the present government, which the election had in fact been
designed to achieve. . This legitimisation was enhanced by the high voter turnout,
which surprised many observers, because civil society had already demonstrated its
support of the new regime by its own means during the critical phase of transition in
2002. As soon as the provisional results indicating Ravalomanana's victory were
published, his government called on donors to keep their promises to step up their
assistance for Madagascar’s economic recovery (cf. UN Integrated Regional Informa-
tion Networks (Nairobi), 23 December 2002). The African Union, which had been
reluctant to endorse the new president, indicated in January a revision of its position
after realising the strength of his support. The opposition alleged that voting was
rigged and cited a number of irregularities, but very few of these were confirmed by
the HCC.12
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To repeat: the promotion of procedural multi-party democratisation, without due
regard to the socio-cultural setting of African countries, does not lead to substantial
democracy in Western understanding. More than a two-thirds majority in the
National Assembly and the absence of a substantial opposition signifies the absence
of any effective reins on the powers of the president. He will be almost as powerful as
his predecessor, who ruled in the name of a socialist party representing a one-party
state. This is already a concern for independent political commentators on the country
(cf. Marcus, 2002:26; Marcus & Razafindrakoto, 2003; Urfer, 2003).
Conclusions
Election observation has become a valuable instrument of international policy in
promoting democratisation in Africa. Nevertheless, its effectiveness could be
enhanced significantly if observer missions would follow its declared aims and
improve the methodology of election observation correspondingly. Unfortunately, an
inadequate approach which allowed for diplomatic or technocratic bias in the
outcome of election observation missions, has undermined the credibility of this
instrument for the following reasons.
First, the diplomatic bias in evaluating the electoral process, much deplored within
the academic community, has had ambiguous effects. This ambiguity allowed for a
considerable range of observer statements, which resulted even in contradicting
evaluations of the electoral process. In some crucial cases, like the South African or
Nigerian founding elections of 1994 and 1999 respectively, obscuring the actual
dimension of electoral rigging and violence for diplomatic reasons may have been
justified by the paramount political intention of conflict prevention. In other cases,
such obfuscation was merely a reflection of partisan peer-review policies of
international observer missions in order to back outdated autocratic regimes, like in
the case of Togo or Zimbabwean presidential elections in 2002 and 2003. In order to
prevent the legitimisation of rigged elections and the acceptance of gross human
rights violations by development-retarding despotic regimes through partisan peer
review, it would be advisable to prescribe any diplomatic covering of rigged electoral
processes and to draw a sharp distinction between the aims, methods and procedures
of international election observation on the one hand, and those of other policy
instruments, like crisis prevention, on the other.
Second, growing professionalism of election observation by major international
players like the EU contributed to a significant reduction of the diplomatic bias in
their observer statements, although it could not eliminate it entirely. However, the
call for expertise also had ambiguous effects. At the same time as its proponents tried
to side-step undue political interference, they risked falling into the trap of another
bias, at least as virulent, and still more difficult to detect and to cure: the technocratic
bias. This tendency is even more difficult to recognise, because it is typically based on
positivist or Eurocentric world views and corresponding methodologies, which are
mostly taken for granted by those who apply them. In particular, it corresponds to the
mainstream reasoning of the international consulting business and of technical aid in
general. But even those who are sceptical about piecemeal social engineering, and
who take due account of the socio-cultural dimension of election observation, may
turn a blind eye to the formalistic interpretation of an observer’s task in certain cases,
because the results from a formalistic approach fit in well with other, often
undeclared vested interests of foreign policy. In this case the same applies as with the
diplomatic bias. To overcome the technocratic bias of international election
observation, it would be necessary to identify its sources and to develop
counteracting measures. In the following I want to summarise the most important
points in this respect, returning to the example of the EU’s observer mission in
Madagascar.
The concentration of professional election observation on formal politics and its quest
for scientifically sound quantitative methods (e.g. sample survey of polling stations)
barred it from reflecting on both the socio-cultural dimension of Malagasy ‘politics of
the belly’, and on the ‘bottom-up’ evaluation of the local political and cultural setting.
However, the former may have decisively influenced the election, voters’ behaviour,
and the counting and transfer of voting results and complaints from village to district
and provincial levels. Generally speaking, the search for a sound methodological
observation approach should be appreciated, as it enhances public and international
recognition of the observation results. However, the implementation of this
methodology requires a certain minimum of time and resources. If these requirements
are not met, as has been the rule rather than the exception, the restriction to those facts
which can easily be observed by foreign observers not acquainted with the local
structures, bears the risk of being heavily biased in favour of the prevailing power
structure. To counteract these tendencies, observer missions should employ in key
positions experts who are well informed about the countries’ informal politics. More
detailed information on informal politics in the respective country, should be
included in the information booklets provided to the observers well in advance of
their arrival.
In addition, the ‘top-down’ approach of election observation as applied by the EU
observation mission in Madagascar, with a hierarchical line of command, is difficult
to adapt to the local political and socio-cultural conditions, notably in remote rural
areas. More flexible reactions by those experts familiar with the local socio-cultural
setting should be allowed for. In fact, to put it in a nutshell, any biased approach of
election observation, be it for diplomatic or for technocratic reasons, is undermining
efforts to broaden and deepen African democratic polity.
Dirk Kohnert,  Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg; e-mail: Kohnert@iak.duei.de.
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Endnotes
1. In the following the term ‘founding’ elections embraces both ‘reconciliatory’ and ‘transitional’
elections (cf. Douglas, 1998:472); this definition is broader and more adapted to African conditions
of ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart) than that of Bratton and van de Walle (1997:196) who defined
founding elections as elections in which ‘the office of head of government was openly contested
following a period during which multiparty politics had been denied.’
2. Concerning outstanding examples of misguided approaches of ‘technical assistance’ cf. the
debate about the ‘training and visit’ approach of the extension service as driving belt of the ‘Green
revolution’ in Africa, or the critique of the ‘logical framework’ and similar target orientated
planning methods (ZOPP), propagated during the 1980s and early 1990s by German technical
assistance (GTZ) and other major donors. Both are examples of approaches of development
assistance with insufficient regard to the socio-cultural dimension and the neglect of indigenous
knowledge (cf. Kohnert, Preuss & Sauer,1992; Kohnert & Weber, 1991; Kohnert, 1994).
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3. The informal Toblerone group, i.e. diplomats, accredited in the Malagasy capital, who were in
favour of a transition, and met regularly during the period of crisis at the Swiss embassy (cf. ROI
Madagascar, 15-16 October 2002).
4. According to the Malagasy constitution (Article 77) the Senate is composed as follows: two-
thirds of members elected from the different provinces (at the time of election in 2001 still under
the Ratsiraka regime) and one-third of members nominated by the head of state. Up to 2002 both
groups were overwhelmingly pro-Ratsiraka. In between Ravalomanana replaced the 30 nominated
members by his own followers, including Rajemison, a right hand of Ravalomanana, as president
of the senate (cf. Joël Ralaivaohita: ‘Le Sénat: une Chambre de trop?’, madonline, 22 January 2003).
5. cf. The EU’s Human rights & Democratisation Policy, http://europa.eu.int/comm/
external_relations/human_rights/ eu_election_ass_observ/index.htm, 10 June 2003. The linkage
between democracy and development is not as straight as indicated in this quotation, but space
does not permit to elaborate this point further (cf. Engel et al. 1996).
6. A Ghanaian saying, quoted by Douglas (1998:492), puts it in a similar vein: ‘A stranger to a place
has big eyes but cannot see’.
7. For some STOs it took up to four days of cumbersome journey (back and forth), including some
14 hours’ drive on difficult tracks up to midnight, as the rainy season began, to reach their
destination. In short, observers missed important issues of the final pre-electoral phase as well as
the election itself.
8. ‘Une analyse strictement légaliste de la situation ferait abstraction de réalités qu’on ne peut
ignorer et limiterait la recherche de solutions. Aujourd’hui le problème n’est plus seulement
juridique, il est surtout politique’ (cf. CNOE 2002).
9. Vazaha, is the Malagasy designation for white people, or any outsider – black or white – who has
a comportment similar to the former (French) colonialists.
10. The request (HCC file No. 10/03: ‘Houssen Ibrahim, Bavy Lucienne. Annulation des résultats
dans les 14 bv de la commune de Milanoa, Vohémar’) was filed under the heading ‘Requêtes
irrecevable (car produites en un seul exemplaires)’ www.simicro.mg/hcc/legislatives/
legAR0103.htm, 3 March 2003. In view of the local socio-cultural setting in which the candidate
was embedded, this decision was certainly not an indicator of the impartiality of the HCC. In his
declaration of 11 January 2003, on the final results of the legislative election, the HCC cancelled
the election of just four parliamentarians, the one of Vohemar was not included. According to the
list of all officially confirmed parliamentarians elected on 15 December 2002, their constituency
and party affiliation, published on the website of the HCC: www.simicro.mg/hcc/legislatives/
Faritany2/leg209a.htm, 3 March 2003, the TIM candidate, Auguste Ramaromisy, had finally
succeeded in winning the election in Vohemar.
11. For some results of the 2002 election, see the website of the Interior Ministry in Antananarive,
www.legislatives.mg, 3 March 2003. According to the preliminary results the presidential party
TIM gained 102, and its allies of the National Alliance, the AVI gained 24, and the RPSD 6 seats;
AREMA won just three seats. Although this startling victory was partially due to the voting system
(candidates were elected on a ‘first-past-the-post’ basis in a single-round election in the
constituencies in which there was only one seat to be filled and by proportional representation
from lists in constituencies with several seats to fill (Art. 66; http://
www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/, 6 October  2003). Although nationwide the candidates of the
mouvance présidentielle failed to reach the 50 per cent barrier, the great majority of voters
undoubtedly voted for a change (cf. Marchés Tropicaux, 03.01.03:28).
12. The HCC decided on 10 January 2003 re-elections in four constituencies: Maintirano, Benenitra,
Ihosy, and Beloha, on 9 March 2003 (arrêt n° 01/HCC/AR ; MIDI-Madagascar, 23 January 2003);
www.legislative.mg (website extinct).
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